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CONTINGENT VALUE OF DIRECTOR IDENTIFICATION: 
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT DIRECTORS IN MONITORING AND RESOURCE 
PROVISION IN AN EMERGING ECONOMY 
 
Research summary: Although previous studies have explored the value of government 
directors, less attention has been directed at the antecedents of government directors’ 
engagement in value-adding activities, such as managerial monitoring and resource provision. 
Drawing on social identity theory, we offer a novel model that specifies how a government 
director’s dual identifications with the focal firm and with the government individually and 
interactively affect his or her governance behavior. An investigation of government directors in 
China shows that their identification with the focal firm enhances monitoring and resource 
provision, while their identification with the government affects monitoring and resource 
provision differently depending on the dominance of state ownership. The 
synergistic/substitutable effects between the two types of identification are contingent on state 
ownership and governance roles. 
 
Managerial summary: This study examines how a government director’s dual identities—as a 
government official and as a board member of a focal firm affect his or her engagement in 
managerial monitoring and resource provision. Using data of Chinese listed firms, we find that 
government directors who strongly identify with the focal firm or with the government are highly 
motivated to fulfill their fiduciary obligations. However, the positive effects of their 
identification with the government differ between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-
SOEs. The combination of the two identifications offers a further boost to monitoring in non-
SOEs, and to resource provision in both SOEs and non-SOEs, but it acts as a disincentive to 
monitoring in SOEs.  
 
 
Key words: government director, identification, monitoring, resource provision, state-owned 
enterprise
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To reduce the uncertainty that arises from their interdependency with the government 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Shaffer, 1995), firms often have government officials sitting on their 
boards. For example, in 1988, 53 percent of large corporate boards in the U.S. included former 
government officials (Hillman, 2005), and in 2007, 16 percent of independent directors of 
Chinese listed firms were acting government officials (Heidrick and Struggles, 2007). Despite 
the prevalence of government directors, we know relatively little about how they serve the 
functions of monitoring and resource provision to affect firm performance. Former political 
actors on the board of U.S. firms have been found to enhance firm performance (Hillman, 2005), 
but they have limited effects on firm performance in emerging economies (Clarke, 2003; 
Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008). The divergent findings of the effectiveness of government 
directors suggest the importance of understanding government directors’ governance roles and 
their antecedents. 
Recent research on board functions suggests that directors’ human and social capital 
enable them to monitor management and provide resources to a focal firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003). However, whether they do so is influenced by their identification with the firm (Golden-
Biddle and Rao, 1997) and with other context-relevant entities (Ashforth and Johnson, 2001; 
Hillman, Nicholson, and Shropshire, 2008). Directors are not equally motivated to fulfill 
fiduciary obligations (McNulty, Roberts, and Stiles, 2005), and their individual-level 
engagement depends on the strength of their identifications with pertinent identities. Government 
directors have dual identities—corporate director and government official—and thus are likely to 
identify both with the focal firm and with the government. We suggest that such dual 
identifications enable or constrain government directors to engage in monitoring and resource 
provision both individually and interactively. Their governance effects may depend on the firm’s 
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interests, the government’s interests, and the convergence (or divergence) of these two entities’ 
interests.   
In developing this line of argument, we offer a model that specifies whether and how 
government directors’ identifications both with the focal firm and with the government can 
influence their engagement in monitoring and resource provision in the context of China. China 
offers a particularly appropriate setting in which to examine our research questions. Like other 
emerging economies, China features a nascent corporate governance regime, underdeveloped 
market intermediaries, and extensive government involvement in the economy (Allen, Qian, and 
Qian, 2005; Young et al., 2008), making government directors critical for firms to manage 
interdependency with the government. However, they do not necessarily apply their boundary-
spanning advantages to governance activities due to the nascent role of directors in China (Peng, 
2004), suggesting the importance of director identifications in shaping governance behavior. 
Meanwhile, the state is often involved in the economy as the dominant shareholder (McFarlan, 
Xu, and Manty, 2009; Tenev and Zhang, 2002). It also affects the corporate governance process 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by appointing representatives to boards and management 
positions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). As a result, government directors 
confront distinct sets of opportunities and constraints on their governance roles in SOEs and non-
SOEs. This characteristic of Chinese government directors thus allows us to investigate the 
potential interplay between two governance mechanisms—boards of directors and controlling 
shareholders such as the state owner, who have strong incentives and superior ability to monitor 
management (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005). More importantly, as state ownership is 
also significant in many other emerging economies, such as Russia, India, Brazil, and Indonesia 
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(Kowalski et al., 2013), our findings may shed light on the governance roles of government 
directors in these economies.  
Our empirical analysis uses a unique dataset that combines survey data and archival data 
on government officials serving on the boards of publicly listed firms in China. Our results show 
that government directors’ identification with the focal firm enhances their engagement in 
monitoring and resource provision, while their identification with the government affects 
monitoring and resource provision differentially, depending on the dominance of state 
ownership. The interplay between the two types of identification further enhances or dampens 
directors’ commitment to governance roles and such effects vary between SOEs and non-SOEs.  
This study advances our understanding of government directors by highlighting the 
significance of their dual identifications in shaping governance behavior, and by identifying an 
important but understudied contingency of the effects of identifications—state ownership. It 
extends the research on how directors’ multiple identifications influence their behavior (Golden-
Biddle and Rao, 1997; Withers, Corley, and Hillman, 2012). It also enriches research on 
corporate governance in the emerging economies by explicitly considering the influence of 
salient institutional factors, such as concentrated state ownership and the nascent corporate 
governance system, on directors’ behavior. Further, the differential governance effects of 
directors’ identifications on SOEs and non-SOEs shed light on how the governance mechanisms, 
boards of directors and controlling shareholders, simultaneously affect monitoring and resource 
provision, which has been understudied in previous research. As government directors typically 
form boundary-spanning links between firms and government, our study also contributes to the 
political tie literature by showing that in addition to the prominence of political partners (i.e., 
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resources and privileges at disposal), motivating political partners to serve the firm’s interests is 
crucial to deriving benefits from political ties.  
FUNCTIONS OF DIRECTORS 
The corporate governance literature indicates that directors perform two important functions: 
monitoring managers on behalf of shareholders, and providing resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Directors monitor managers’ actions (e.g., decision 
making, strategy implementation and CEO succession) to ensure that management operates in 
the interest of shareholders, thus helping to resolve the agency problem (Fama, 1980; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Agency theory suggests that the independence of directors from management is 
critical to effective monitoring (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Daily and Dalton, 1994). Directors 
also help firms to manage their dependence on external institutions by providing advice and 
counseling, access to external resources and information, and legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Resource dependence theory contends that directors’ human capital and social capital are 
primary precursors of their resource provision activities. Human capital refers to an individual’s 
expertise, experience, and skills (Becker, 1964), and social capital represents the resources that 
are embedded in the individual’s social networks (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Directors’ 
human capital and social capital are conducive to their resource provision to firms (e.g., 
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997), so we refer to the composite 
of human and social capital as director capital, to capture directors’ ability to serve the resource 
provision function (Haynes and Hillman, 2010).  
In China, boards of directors are supposed to carry out the two functions, as stipulated in 
the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (CSRC, 2001). Board 
directors are accountable to shareholders and are expected to protect minority shareholders from 
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infringement by the controlling shareholder. However, the governance rules and regulations are 
not necessarily enforced stringently (Clarke, 2003; Peng, 2004), and directors’ governance 
behavior may be influenced by other factors, such as their social identities.1    
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION    
Social identity theory focuses on an individual’s self-definition in society, especially in 
intergroup relations and group processes, and treats individuals as members of social categories 
or groups (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). The tenet of the theory is that social categories 
or groups (e.g., nationality, ethnic group, and the organization/firm) affect how members of those 
categories or groups define themselves (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995; Kramer, 1991). It is 
suggested that the group categorization process develops stereotypical and normative perceptions 
of other groups, and consequently a positive in-group bias develops on the basis of those 
perceptions. As a result, the social categories to which a person belongs help to define his or her 
identity and behavior in a given context (Hogg et al., 1995). The importance of a particular 
identity and the degree to which it shapes the person’s behavior depend on how strongly he or 
she identifies with the identity (Ashforth and Johnson, 2001). 
When social identity theory is applied to organizational settings, the concept of 
organizational identification is defined as the process of self-categorization with an organization 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1989). Researchers associate organizational identification of members with 
various forms of organizational behavior, especially commitment, cooperation, and reciprocity 
(Dukerich, Golden, and Shortell, 2002; Dutton, Dukerich and Harquai, 1994; Hekman et al., 
2009). They contend that members who strongly identify with the organization experience an in-
                                                        
1 Research in the social psychology field differentiates between social identity and role identity, both of which apply 
to directors (Stets and Burke, 2000; Stryker and Serpe, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). In this study, we focus on 
directors’ social identity because the notion of role identity as a director is not well established in emerging 
economies such as China, where corporate governance mechanisms are nascent. 
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group bias and greater group cohesion, which in turn motivates the members to engage in 
cooperative behavior (Dutton et al., 1994). Such behavior benefits not only the organization, but 
also its members, because they regard themselves as part of the organization. Thus, social 
identity theory asserts that members have varying degrees of identification with the 
organization(s) to which they belong (Dutton et al., 1994; Hekman et al., 2009), and that the 
strength of this organizational identification is related to members’ behaving in ways that are 
beneficial to the organization. Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997) show that directors’ stronger 
identification with the focal firm makes them more engaged in the boardroom, suggesting that 
organizational identification and commitment are positively related (Ashforth, Harrison, and 
Corley, 2008; Riketta, 2005).  
Social identity research also indicates that people generally identify with multiple entities 
or groups, and these identifications interact with each other; the effect of such interplay largely 
depends on the intrinsic relations among the different identities (Ashforth and Johnson, 2001). 
When a person’s identities are aligned with each other due to significant overlaps in the goals of 
the multiple sources of identity, there is complementarity between them. When the identities are 
not aligned, however, there may be conflicts due to competing demands between the different 
identities and conflicting goals between multiple sources of identity (Hillman et al., 2008). 
Additionally, the effects of identity alignment/non-alignment may vary depending on an 
individual’s specific behavior or activities (Scott, 1997). These insights suggest that government 
directors’ dual identifications with the government and with the focal firm may jointly affect 
their governance behavior, and that such interactive effects can differ between managerial 
monitoring and resource provision.   
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Government directors are likely to identify with the government and with the focal firm 
simultaneously to varying degrees. Given his or her affiliation with a government and/or its 
agencies, a government director tends to identify with the government to some extent2, but the 
deep roots and features of such identification differ in distinct political systems. Government 
directors in democratic countries may identify with the government primarily because they 
endorse the policies made by the specific political party in power (Hetherington, 2009). Their 
identification with the government is volatile, however, because competition between political 
parties for political power often leads to changes in the regime and political agenda. For 
example, in the U.S. context, a Democratic director’s identification with the government tends to 
become weaker when the Republican Party takes over power from the Democratic Party 
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006; Poole and Rosenthal, 1984). Those who do not embrace 
any particular political party may identify with the government simply because of their 
nationalistic sentiment. Thus, government directors’ identification with the government tends to 
be rather nebulous in democratic political systems. 
In contrast, when one political party dominates political power and controls government 
institutions, government directors generally feature strong identification with the government 
due to the stability and consistency of the government’s objectives and policy agenda. In China, 
for example, the Communist Party controls the government while other political parties have 
limited political power, despite their participation in policy making (Chen and Zhong, 1998). As 
a result of the enduring dominance of the Communist Party, only those who support its policy 
agenda are allowed to work for the government (Chen and Dickson, 2010). Compared to 
                                                        
2 We regard government directors’ identification with the government more as a social identification than role 
identification when examining its effects on directors’ governance roles. This is because a government official’s 
social identity is likely to play a significant role on the basis of government affiliation, whereas the effects of his/her 
role identity, which may differ among government institutions and levels of government, tend to be less obvious. 
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governments in democratic countries, the Chinese government’s main objectives tend to be 
stable over time and consistent across levels of government and their agencies. This government 
stability and consistency may make it easier for government directors to understand and embrace 
the government’s objectives and policies, to identify with the government, and thereby to pursue 
the objectives under the guidance of relevant government policies when sitting on corporate 
boards. Government directors’ identification with the government is thus likely to affect their 
governance behavior in China and other countries with similar political systems.  
At the same time, the strength of government directors’ identification with the focal firm 
may exhibit substantial variations in China, because Chinese firms take different approaches to 
board appointments. Chinese private firms often invite government directors with rich human 
and social capital to sit on their boards, in the hope that they will better manage their dependence 
on the government (Peng, 2004). In the case of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), however, 
government officials are often appointed to corporate boards by the central government and 
government agencies such as “state assets management bureaus” that control the assets of SOEs 
(Tenev and Zhang, 2002; Xu and Wang, 1999). As state representatives, government directors 
have a fiduciary duty to uphold government policies (Su, Xu, and Phan, 2008). Moreover, they 
can be promoted to higher ranks of government institutions if government agencies deem their 
performance satisfactory (Li and Zhou, 2005). Such politically-based directorships may make the 
strength of government directors’ identification with SOEs different from the strength of their 
identification with private firms. The prevalence of government directors and intense state 
involvement in the economy in China hence offer an ideal setting in which to investigate how 
directors’ multiple identifications shape board functions and how such effects may be contingent 
on the dominance of state ownership.  
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HYPOTHESES 
Effects of director identification with the focal firm 
When government directors strongly identify with the focal firm, they are likely to act in ways 
that benefit it. As suggested by research on the behavioral implications of an individual’s 
identification with his or her organization, the stronger the identification with the organization, 
the greater the cooperation, satisfaction, and motivation to be expected in his or her behavior 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Shamir, 1990). Evidence also indicates that members who identify 
strongly with an organization are inclined to engage in organization citizenship behavior (Dutton 
et al., 1994). In the context of the boardroom, Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997) suggest a positive 
relationship between a director’s identification with a firm and the likelihood of the director 
acting in the firm’s interests. Hillman and her colleagues (2008) also contend that the strength of 
a director’s identification with an organization has positive effects on monitoring and resource 
provision for the organization. 
  Building on these insights, we maintain that government directors tend to engage more 
in monitoring and resource provision as their identification with the focal firm increases because 
effective governance is in the interests of the firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Government 
directors’ identification with the focal firm may impel them to leverage their expertise and 
knowledge of government procedures and regulations to evaluate the possible effects of strategic 
initiatives proposed by the CEO (Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer, 2002). They may also provide 
advice and counsel to improve strategic plans, through using their insight to predict government 
actions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). Moreover, government directors introduce external 
referrals, especially with the state sector, to aid resource acquisition, information sharing, and 
business planning (Hillman, 2005). Further, they make efforts to improve the firm’s image and 
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expand external communication channels by taking advantage of their networks in the state 
sector (Stern and Westphal, 2010).  
Identification with the focal firm is likely to play an even more salient role in enhancing 
boardroom engagement in emerging economies where corporate governance mechanisms are 
nascent (Dharwadkar, George, and Brandes, 2000; Mitton, 2002). Firms in many emerging 
economies did not have boards of directors until the corporate governance reforms began in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. In the case of China, the first firms listed on the newly established 
stock exchanges were required to have boards of directors in 1990, and independent directors 
were not mandatory until 2001 (CSRC, 2001). Given the short history of corporate governance 
reform, few individuals in China understood and internalized the need and means for effective 
board control. In fact, many directors still view their directorships either as sinecures or as an 
attempt to impose Western standards and values on people (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008). The 
presumed incentives to monitor management and provide resources on behalf of shareholders 
tend to be rather weak because directors are unfamiliar with or reluctant to accept governance 
practices adopted in developed economies (Peng, 2004), even though the governance rules 
require them to protect and advance the firm’s interests.  
In such a weak governance environment, government directors’ identification with the 
focal firm is likely to be a critical driver for them to understand, accept, and fulfill their fiduciary 
duties. Regarding the firm’s interests as equivalent to their own, government directors who 
strongly identify with the firm may not be willing to rubber-stamp the management’s decisions, 
but rather, will closely monitor managerial decision making (Capezio et al., 2014). Instead of 
accepting compensation without making substantive contributions, government directors would 
rather aid firms to obtain financial credits (Khwaja and Mian, 2005), foreign technology (Siegel, 
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2007), preferential treatment (Cull and Xu, 2005; Faccio, 2010), and the opportunity to be bailed 
out during a crisis (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006) by taking advantage of their 
connections with government. Our theory development suggests that the more strongly 
government directors identify with the focal firm, the more likely they are to engage in their 
governance functions. Thus, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1a: The strength of a government director’s identification with the focal firm is 
positively related to managerial monitoring. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The strength of a government director’s identification with the focal firm is 
positively related to resource provision. 
 
Effects of director identification with the government 
A government director’s identification with the government is also likely to promote his or her 
monitoring of the focal firm and provision of resources to it because these are prescribed forms 
of behavior for directors in the corporate governance system of China. Driven by the market-
oriented transition since 1978, the Chinese government has adopted legal frameworks of 
corporate governance similar to those established in developed economies, with the expectation 
that greater accountability and transparency of corporate governance will enhance the 
competitiveness of domestic firms (Heidrick and Struggles, 2007; Young et al., 2008). 
Moreover, the adoption of international corporate governance practices is viewed as conducive 
to attracting foreign direct investment to boost the economy (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008). The 
enhanced corporate governance standard is thus expected to facilitate not only the growth and 
proliferation of domestic firms, but also the pursuit of the government’s key objectives such as 
economic growth, enhanced social welfare, and social stability. This suggests that the interests of 
the government coincide with the interests of firms in regard to improving corporate governance.  
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In fact, China has established systematic laws and regulations regarding corporate 
governance mechanisms. Protection of the firm’s interests is the first priority of the board under 
the Chinese corporate governance regime, and directors are responsible for monitoring 
management and providing resources for the firm (Company Law, 2006; OECD, 2011). 
However, these laws and regulations are not enforced effectively, mainly because of the short 
history of corporate governance in China and the relationship-based culture of Chinese society 
(Peng, 2004; Young and McGuinness, 2001). Under such circumstances, identification with the 
government may impel government directors to vigorously engage in monitoring and resource 
provision because these are the overriding obligations for directors, and are formally required by 
government. Carrying out their fiduciary duties in the firm’s interests allows government 
directors who strongly identify with the government to show their adherence to government 
policies, their commitment to the attainment of government objectives, and their belongingness 
to the government. Failure to do so may cause them to feel embarrassed and guilty because such 
failure would impair their self-definition as a member of government (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). 
In contrast, those who weakly identify with the government may be less concerned with these 
matters and thus serve as passive or irresponsible board members, paying limited attention to the 
government’s laws and regulations. 
With an intrinsic desire to fulfill their obligations, government directors who strongly 
identify with the government are likely to commit themselves to studying governance laws and 
regulations, enforcing them stringently, and finding optimal means to serve the firm’s interests 
within the framework of government policies. Equipped with accumulative knowledge and 
experience of policy making and strategic planning from the state sector, they are able to assess 
the legitimacy, feasibility, and long-term influence of strategic initiatives proposed by the 
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management, and provide advice in the firm’s best interests. Indeed, government directors have 
been found to facilitate entry into newly opened-up sectors (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001), 
preferential allocation of government procurement contracts (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2013), 
and management of uncertainty from the regulatory regime (Hillman, 2005). Identification with 
the government may also motivate government directors to leverage their social capital in the 
political field to provide the firm with access to proprietary resources (e.g., advanced technology 
and skills) and information that is unavailable or costly to obtain from other sources (Li and 
Zhang, 2007; Potter, 2002). Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2a: The strength of a government director’s identification with the government is 
positively related to managerial monitoring. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The strength of a government director’s identification with the government is 
positively related to resource provision. 
  
Effects of director identification with the government in SOEs versus non-SOEs  
The predicted effects of identification with the government, however, may vary depending on the 
focal firm’s ownership structure. Unlike widely held public firms in the U.S. and the U.K., firms 
in emerging economies are characterized by concentrated ownership (Claessens, Simeon, and 
Lang, 2000; Kowalski et al., 2013). In China, where the state controlled the entire economy 
before the transition to a market economy, state ownership has continued to play a dominant role 
since large-scale privatization (Sun and Tong, 2003). For example, the state directly or indirectly 
owned 54 percent of listed firms’ shares (in the form of state shares and legal person shares) in 
2010 and state-owned enterprises still comprise a significant portion of national industrial 
outputs (Allen et al., 2005). 
The dominance of state ownership in SOEs is likely to compromise the effect that 
identification with the government has on monitoring for three major reasons. First, to exercise 
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their control rights, controlling shareholders usually appoint directors who represent their 
interests to the board (Morck, et al., 2005). In Chinese SOEs, the state often places bureaucrats 
on the board as outside directors to comply with the regulations on corporate governance, even 
though the independence of the directors is questionable (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008). More 
than half of the directors of listed SOEs are appointed by the state (Bai et al., 2004). These 
government directors serve as the state’s representatives and thus tend to interpret their fiduciary 
obligations in light of the state’s interests and rubber-stamp decisions made by state owners 
(Clarke, 2003; Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012). Government directors of SOEs have indeed been 
found to be ineffective monitors (Chang and Wong, 2004). Although government directors who 
strongly identify with the government are motivated to monitor management on behalf of 
shareholders, their politically-based directorships may make them prioritize the state’s interests 
and thereby dampen their incentive for monitoring. Second, the appointment of CEOs of SOEs is 
also a highly political process in which CEOs are often selected through government referral or 
directly by the state owner (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007; Heidrick and Struggles, 2007). For 
example, the top management teams of the 50 largest Chinese SOEs, some of which are parents 
of multiple listed firms, are directly appointed by the Politburo. As a result, many government 
directors and politically selected CEOs are former colleagues in government sectors and tend to 
cooperate with each other to pursue their political careers (Holz, 2007). Enduring ties with CEOs 
and the consequent lack of independence from the management make government directors 
reluctant to monitor management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, both government 
directors and politically connected CEOs serve the interests of the state and make efforts to 
achieve the state’s political and social objectives in SOEs (Su et al., 2008; The Economist, 2013). 
Such congruent goals and shared values may render it less imperative for government directors 
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to monitor management, even though the directors’ identification with the government motivates 
them to do so.   
In contrast, government directors of non-SOEs do not necessarily have strong ties with 
the firm’s large shareholders and the selection of CEOs is generally on the basis of merit, hence 
government directors have substantial leeway to engage in managerial monitoring in non-SOEs. 
McFarlan et al. (2009) report that the CEOs of listed Chinese firms, including SOEs and non-
SOEs, view the board of directors as the strongest internal constraint on management, although 
outside directors of SOEs tend not to challenge and criticize managerial decision making due to 
their lack of independence. Thus, we submit that government directors who identify with the 
government should be more vigilant monitors in non-SOEs than in SOEs because concentrated 
state ownership may induce disincentives for managerial monitoring. 
With regard to resource provision, government directors who strongly identify with the 
government tend to be more devoted in SOEs than in non-SOEs for four reasons. First, they are 
typically appointed to SOEs by government to channel resources and information between the 
firm and the state, which enhances the SOEs’ growth and ultimately the interests of the state 
owner (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Their political connections and skills may be particularly useful 
and even indispensable in dealings with government agencies (Frederick, 2011), especially 
considering the strong political influence imposed on SOEs. Second, given their ties to the 
government and sometimes also to management, government directors are effectively dependent 
or quasi-inside directors (Peng, 2004), who are likely to be more motivated than independent 
directors to provide resources to the focal firm and its management (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Westphal, 1999). Furthermore, the common goal of government directors and politically selected 
CEOs to serve the interests of the government might lead to higher levels of mutual trust, better 
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information disclosure, and the provision of more critical and valuable resources (Gaertner et al., 
1990; Gulati and Westphal, 1999). In addition, government directors who have superior 
governance performance in SOEs will have a greater chance of promotion along the political 
hierarchy, but their counterparts in non-SOEs do not have such an option. Political promotion 
has been found to impel top executives of SOEs to enhance firm performance (Cao et al., 2014). 
The political promotion opportunity for government directors in SOEs thus creates an additional 
incentive for their resource provision. The above theory development leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2c: The positive effect of a government director’s identification with the government 
on managerial monitoring is weaker in SOEs than in non-SOEs. 
 
Hypothesis 2d: The positive effect of a government director’s identification with the government 
on resource provision is stronger in SOEs than in non-SOEs. 
 
Interface between identification with the focal firm and identification with the government 
A distinguishing feature of a government director is that he or she has dual identities—as a 
government official and as a board member of the focal firm—so we further consider how their 
identifications with these two identities jointly affect their governance behavior.   
Effects on monitoring  
A government director’s strong identification with the focal firm and the government should 
provide additional incentives for him or her to monitor management because this fiduciary 
obligation is beneficial to both the firm and the government. However, the effect of such identity 
alignment on monitoring is likely to be contingent on the presence of controlling shareholders 
who can alter the nature of the corporate governance process (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Young et 
al., 2008). In SOEs, the major concern of corporate governance is the principal-principal 
conflicts between the state owner and minority shareholders (Morck et al., 2005). Minority 
 19 
shareholders are subject to expropriation by the state owner, who can appoint representatives to 
the board and management positions and effectively control decisions made in the boardroom. 
Given the state’s tight control over the firm and the management’s political careers, government 
directors who identify with the government are likely to prioritize the interests of the state over 
the interests of other shareholders (Su et al., 2008). At the same time, their identification with the 
focal firm motivates them to protect the interests of shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders. The two identifications hence put competing demands on government directors 
when it comes to monitoring. As a result, as their identification with the government increases, 
government directors with dual identifications may acquiesce to the state’s intervention and 
pursuit of imperative social and political objectives that are detrimental to minority shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 1997). Hence, government directors’ strong identification with the 
government is likely to dampen their monitoring incentives originating from their identification 
with the firm.  
On the contrary, there is likely to be an alignment between government directors’ 
identifications with the two sources in non-SOEs with regard to monitoring. Without the 
constraints imposed by the state owner, government directors who identify with the government 
are motivated to ensure that the managerial decisions are in the firm’s interests because this is 
explicitly required by the government. They are also better able to do so thanks to their greater 
discretion in monitoring. As such, government directors’ identification with the government can 
provide a further boost to monitoring in addition to the effect of their identification with the firm. 
Thus, we hypothesize:       
Hypothesis 3a: The effect of a government director’s identification with the focal firm on 
managerial monitoring is negatively moderated by the director’s identification with the 
government in SOEs. 
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Hypothesis 3b: The effect of a government director’s identification with the focal firm on 
managerial monitoring is positively moderated by the director’s identification with the 
government in non-SOEs. 
 
Effects on resource provision 
In the context of resource provision, there should be an alignment between the effects of 
identification with the focal firm and with the government in both SOEs and non-SOEs. On the 
one hand, government directors who strongly identify with the focal firm are motivated to 
provide resources to serve the firm’s best interests (Hillman et al., 2008). On the other hand, 
their identification with the government means that they act as state representatives in SOEs and 
will benefit the state owner by providing resources to the firm to enhance its performance, 
growth, and competitiveness (Su et al., 2008; Walder, 1995). As resource provision may benefit 
all shareholders, not just the controlling shareholders, the interests of the state owner and other 
shareholders are congruent in resource acquisition, suggesting that identification with the 
government is likely to align with identification with the firm. Similarly, identification with the 
government is likely to motivate government directors in non-SOEs to engage in resource 
provision to fulfill their fiduciary obligations mandated by the government. The convergence of 
the interests of the firm and the government with regard to the provision of resources to SOEs 
and non-SOEs suggests complementarity between identification with the firm and with the 
government. Hence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4a: The effect of a government director’s identification with the focal firm on 
resource provision is positively moderated by the director’s identification with the government in 
SOEs.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: The effect of a government director’s identification with the focal firm on 
resource provision is positively moderated by the director’s identification with the government in 
non-SOEs. 
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METHODS 
Data sources and sample  
Our empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset consisting of survey and archival data of 
government officials acting as outside directors on the boards of Chinese listed firms. To 
construct our sample, we first selected all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges that had government directors on their boards. We then conducted a pretest of the 
questionnaire that included discussions with 10 interviewees about each survey question to 
maximize the response rate of our survey. Based on the feedback received, we improved the 
design and clarity of the questionnaire before conducting a follow-up large-scale survey. In total, 
we sent out 2,006 questionnaires and received 300 copies with complete information between 
March and September 2011, achieving a response rate of 15 percent. In addition to the survey 
data, we also obtained corporate ownership and governance data from the China Stock Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database (http://www.gtarsc.com), which provides 
comprehensive information on the Chinese stock market, financial statements, and corporate 
governance of Chinese listed firms. CSMAR is one of the most reliable sources of information 
about Chinese listed firms. Many prestigious universities and research institutions subscribe to it, 
and several previous studies rely on this source. We dropped 86 observations from the sample 
because information was missing or because the values for some variables appeared unrealistic. 
Our final sample thus included 214 observations of government directors who sat on the boards 
of 95 listed firms. These firms operated in the manufacturing (74.3%), service (24.3%), and 
agricultural (1.4%) sectors, with average assets of RMB561 million (about US$93million) in 
2011. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) two-sample tests indicated that directors who responded to 
the survey were representatives of the larger population of outside directors on each of the 
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archival variables used in this study, including age, educational background, and firm 
profitability. As 64 percent of sample firms had more than one respondent participating in the 
survey, we controlled for directors’ firm affiliation in the regression analysis to capture the 
potential effect of firm-level factors on directors’ behavior.  
Dependent variables 
The two functions of directors—managerial monitoring and resource provision—were measured 
using multiple survey measures (please refer to Part 1 of the questionnaire in the Appendix). The 
survey questions were developed with reference to previous research on director behavior (e.g., 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Lester et al., 2008). We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis on 
the items for specific functions. The items for both managerial monitoring (Questions 1–4) and 
resource provision (Questions 5–6) loaded on the same factor and did not load on other factors in 
the measurement model. We used the regression method to estimate the factor scores for all of 
the survey measures and the results remained the same using the Bartlett method. 
Independent variables  
Identification with the focal firm. We measured director identification with the focal firm using 
eight identification items (please refer to Part 2 of the questionnaire in the Appendix). The 
survey items were adapted from previous research on measures of group identification and social 
identification (Bergami and Bagozzi, 2000; Mael and Ashforth, 1992), which have been widely 
used in corporate governance research (e.g., McDonald and Westphal, 2010). The confirmatory 
factor analysis showed that the survey items for identification with the focal firm all loaded on 
the same factor.  
Identification with the government. We gauged director identification with the government 
using eight items that are similar to those measuring identification with the focal firm (please 
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refer to Part 3 of the questionnaire in the Appendix). All of the items loaded on the same factor 
in the confirmatory factor analysis.  
Control variables 
We controlled for director attributes and firm characteristics that may affect directors’ 
identification with the focal firm and with the government, and their engagement in managerial 
monitoring and resource provision. We used several indicators to capture director capital, 
including educational background, tenure in government service, the number of positions held in 
the government and its agencies, and managerial experience in state-owned enterprises. These 
indicators have been widely used in studies of the human and social capital of directors (Haynes 
and Hillman, 2010; Lester et al., 2008; Peng, 2004). We obtained the data on directors’ 
educational backgrounds from CSMAR and the data on the other variables from the survey. 
These variables were standardized and summed to create an index of director capital. Cronbach’s 
(1951) alpha between these measures was 0.68. Directors’ age and the number of board seats 
they hold simultaneously may affect their incentive and ability to perform their governance roles. 
The rewards that directors receive from their focal firms may also affect the strength of their 
identification with those firms. 
The dominance of state ownership was measured with a dummy variable to indicate 
whether the controlling shareholder of the firm is the state. SOE dummy was coded 1 if the state 
owns more than 51 percent of shareholding of the firm, and 0 otherwise. Independent 
directorship was measured as the percentage of independent directors on the board to reflect the 
degree of board independence. Foreign ownership refers to the shareholdings owned by foreign 
institutional investors, such as foreign banks, funds, and foreign governments. Foreign 
ownership often requires transparency and professional management practices that may be 
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sensitive to government directors’ governance behavior. Government affiliation level indicates 
the level of government with which a government director is affiliated. Following the 
classification of the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics (ARIES), the most 
comprehensive dataset compiled by the Chinese statistical office, we assigned a value according 
to the level of government affiliation: 1 for governments lower than county level, 2 for county 
level, 3 for city level, 4 for provincial level, and 5 for state level. Business relations between the 
focal firm and government can influence government directors’ dual identifications, so we 
created a dummy variable, business relation, which was coded 1 when the focal firm has 
business relations with the government, and 0 otherwise. We also controlled for firm ROA 
because it might affect the strength of director identification with the firm.  
Analysis 
We estimated the effects of director identification with the focal firm and with the government 
on monitoring and resource provision using multiple regression analysis. We tested two 
dependent variable models: one focusing on the effect on managerial monitoring and the other 
examining the effect on resource provision. As our sample contained responses from more than 
one government director sitting on the board of the same firm, we adjusted for the non-
independence of observations involving directors from the same firm by clustering observations 
around the firm (Mizruchi and Stearns, 2001). The variance inflation factors and tolerance were 
all within acceptable limits for the variables, ranging from 1.1–1.8 and 1.2–2.3, respectively.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and regression results 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients among the variables. Table 
2 shows the results of the multiple regression analysis. Models 1 to 6 were used to test the 
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hypotheses concerning managerial monitoring, while Models 7 to 12 were used to examine the 
hypotheses concerning resource provision. Models 1 and 7 included all of the control variables 
and served as baseline models, while the subsequent models included the variables for testing the 
hypotheses.  
******Table 1 about here****** 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b suggest that higher levels of director identification with the focal 
firm are associated with greater managerial monitoring and resource provision, respectively. As 
indicated in Models 2 and 8 in Table 2, director identification with the focal firm has significant 
and positive relationships with both managerial monitoring (p<0.01) and resource provision 
(p<0.01), supporting Hypotheses 1a and 1b.   
Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict that director identification with the government promotes 
managerial monitoring and resource provision, respectively. Consistent with our predictions, 
Models 3 and 9 show that director identification with the government is positively and 
significantly related to both managerial monitoring (p<0.05) and resource provision (p<0.01). 
Hypothesis 2c predicts that the positive effect of identification with the government on 
monitoring is weaker in SOEs relative to non-SOEs, while Hypothesis 2d posits a stronger 
identification effect on resource provision in SOEs than non-SOEs. To test the two hypotheses, 
we added the interaction term between identification with the government and SOE dummy in 
Models 4 and 10. As predicted in H2c, the interaction term takes a negative sign and is 
statistically significant (p<0.05) in Model 4. Consistent with H2d, the coefficient of the 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant in Model 10 (p<0.05). Figure 1 shows 
how the effects of director identification with the government differ between SOEs and non-
SOEs on monitoring and resource provision. 
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Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict a substitutable effect between identification with the focal 
firm and with the government on monitoring in SOEs, and a synergistic effect on monitoring in 
non-SOEs, respectively. To test H3a, we used the subsample consisting of SOEs and added the 
interaction term between identification with the focal firm and identification with the 
government in Model 5. The result shows that the interaction term is negative and statistically 
significant (p<0.05), supporting H3a. To test H3b, we used the cases of non-SOEs in Model 6 
and found that the interaction term takes a positive sign and is statistically significant (p<0.01). 
Hence, H3b is corroborated. Figure 2 illustrates how the interactive effects between 
identification with the focal firm and identification with the government on managerial 
monitoring differ between SOEs and non-SOEs.  
Finally, Hypotheses 4a and 4b propose that identification with the focal firm and with the 
government complement each other in resource provision in both SOEs and non-SOEs. In 
Models 11 and 12 we used the subsamples of SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively, to test the 
hypotheses. The interaction term takes a positive sign and is statistically significant in both 
Model 11 and Model 12 (p<0.05 and p<0.05 respectively), supporting H4a and H4b. Figure 3 
shows the complementarity between identification with the focal firm and identification with the 
government with regards to resource provision in SOEs and non-SOEs. 
The analysis of the control variables shows that director capital is positively associated 
with managerial monitoring and resource provision, providing supportive empirical evidence to 
the theoretical argument about the value of directors’ human and social capital to their 
governance roles (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Government affiliation level is positively related 
to managerial monitoring, but has no statistically significant effect on resource provision. This 
empirical finding suggests that high-ranking government officials have superior managerial 
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monitoring capabilities than their low-ranking peers, probably due to their exposure to a wider 
range of substantial economic dealings. Foreign ownership has a positive effect on resource 
provision, but does not influence managerial monitoring, probably because foreign investors 
view government directors as a key conduit for resource acquisition from government, which 
renders them committed to this role. 
 ******Figures 1-3 and Table 2 about here****** 
Sensitivity analysis  
As both the dependent and the independent variables were measured by self-report, common 
method variance could potentially have influenced the results. We adopted several strategies to 
detect the extent of common method variance in the data. First, we conducted Harman’s single 
factor test and found that three factors were present, indicating that common method effects are 
unlikely to have contaminated the results observed in this study. We also controlled for the 
effects of common method variance by partialling out a general factor score (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). The results in Table 2 still held. In addition, we tested a model with a single method 
factor and examined a null model (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The results of these analyses indicate 
that latent common method variance did not affect the significance of the parameters of the 
variables of interest. Moreover, our findings on the contingent effects of identifications are 
unlikely to have been affected by common method bias because the respondents could not have 
speculated the interactive relationships underlying the constructs. Hence, common method 
variance was not a pervasive problem in this study. 
Second, we adopted alternative independent variables measured with archival data to test 
the proposed hypotheses. Specifically, we measured a government director’s identification with a 
focal firm by his/her tenure in the current position, and identification with the government by 
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his/her tenure in a government position. These archival data from CSMAR are free from any 
biases that may arise from respondents. The results remained qualitatively the same as those in 
Table 2, except that the differential effects of identification with the government on resource 
provision between SOEs and non-SOEs dissipated. A possible explanation is that a director’s 
tenure in a government position reflects not only his/her identification with the government, but 
also his/her influence and power in the political arena because tenure is often used as a measure 
of power in corporate governance research (Hill and Phan, 1991; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). 
The great political power resulting from long tenure may make resource provision less critical to 
the political career development of long-serving directors, especially in SOEs.  
Third, we measured managerial monitoring and resource provision using the archival data 
on attendance rates at board meetings and the breadth of participation in board discussions, 
respectively. The breadth of participation in board discussions is defined as the ratio of the types 
of issues commented on to the 12 types of issues categorized in CSMAR. Government directors’ 
identification with the focal firm is positively related both to their board meeting attendance rate 
and the breadth of their participation in board discussions, consistent with the results in Table 2. 
However, identification with the government and its interaction with identification with the focal 
firm do not have any effect. This finding is probably because the two alternative measures of 
director functions do not reflect governance activities outside the boardroom (e.g., introducing 
external contacts and discussing managerial decisions at informal meetings), and thus the effects 
of director identifications are underestimated.  
In addition, we considered alternative measures of SOEs using different cutoffs for state 
ownership. Our results remained qualitatively similar to those in Table 2 when we used the 40 
percent and 60 percent cutoffs. Moreover, as the cutoff increased, the positive effect of 
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identification with the government on monitoring weakened and its effect on resource provision 
strengthened in SOEs. Such empirical evidence suggests that identification with the government 
drives government directors of SOEs to play governance roles to varying degrees depending on 
the extent of state control.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study was motivated by the lack of understanding of government directors’ governance 
behavior and their antecedents, especially in the weak governance environment in emerging 
economies. Drawing on social identity theory and corporate governance research, we developed 
a framework of the effects of government directors’ dual identifications on their governance 
behavior. Using government officials on the boards of Chinese listed firms as the research 
setting, we investigated how the strength of directors’ identification with the focal firm and with 
the government affects their monitoring and resource provision individually and interactively. 
We further examined whether and how such effects vary between SOEs and non-SOEs.  
Our results show that directors’ strong identifications with the focal firm and with the 
government promote their engagement in managerial monitoring and resource provision. This 
finding is consistent with the core argument of organizational identification research that the 
stronger a person’s identification with an organization to which he or she belongs, the more he or 
she commits to activities that are beneficial to the organization (Dutton et al., 1994). Moreover, 
we find that strong ties between government directors and CEOs in SOEs, and their common 
goal of serving the state’s interests, mitigate the positive effect that director identification with 
the government has on monitoring, but enhance the effect that it has on resource provision. We 
also find that the combination of the two identifications offers a further boost to monitoring in 
non-SOEs, and to resource provision in both SOEs and non-SOEs, because the firm’s and the 
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government’s interests converge in these cases. However, the dual identifications act as a 
disincentive to monitoring in SOEs because they put competing demands on government 
directors. 
 This study offers implications for three streams of research, specifically, boards of 
directors, corporate governance mechanisms in emerging economies, and corporate political ties. 
First, we contribute to the literature on boards of directors by enhancing our understanding of the 
antecedents of the governance behavior of directors in general and government directors in 
particular. Much of the existing research on boards relies on demographic and structural factors 
(e.g., CEO duality, CEO ownership, outsider ratio, board diversity) to predict board functions, 
with less attention directed at how directors’ psychological factors influence the execution of 
board functions. Although some conceptual works have considered the effects of directors’ 
identities on their behavior (e.g., Hillman et al., 2008; Withers et al., 2012), few studies have 
empirically examined such effects (except Capezio et al., 2014). Our study enriches this stream 
of research by examining how directors’ identifications with multiple identities shape 
governance behavior theoretically and empirically. In particular, we identify the specific 
mechanisms through which the strength of government directors’ dual identifications with the 
focal firm and with the government shape directors’ engagement in monitoring and resource 
provision, both individually and in combination. Moreover, we highlight that the governance 
effects of their dual identifications are contingent on the dominance of state ownership, shedding 
additional light on the conditions under which director identification promotes or inhibits 
governance activities.  
 Our study also advances research on corporate governance in the emerging economies by 
explicitly considering the influence of salient institutional factors, such as concentrated state 
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ownership and nascent corporate governance systems, on directors’ behavior. We find that 
government directors who strongly identify with the government engage in monitoring to a lesser 
extent in SOEs than in non-SOEs because the monitoring role of government directors becomes 
less important or relevant when the state owner exerts control over managerial decisions. In 
contrast, their strong identification with the government facilitates resource provision in SOEs 
more than in non-SOEs, suggesting that state intervention in corporate executive appointments 
and political promotions provides incentives for resource provision. The differences in the 
effects of identification with the government between SOEs and non-SOEs indicate that the 
governance mechanisms based on boards of directors and controlling shareholders substitute 
each other in managerial monitoring, but complement each other in resource provision. Our 
finding complements prior research that emphasizes the substitution among governance 
mechanisms in monitoring (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Sundaramurthy, 1996) and provides insights 
into their relationship in the context of resource provision. It also adds to the literature on 
corporate governance bundles that addresses the interdependencies between multi-level 
governance mechanisms (Aguilera, Desender, and Castro, 2011; Yoshikawa, Zhu, and Wang, 
2014) by showing how the national governance environment, controlling shareholders, and 
individual engagement of directors interact with each other to collectively shape directors’ 
governance behavior.  
Further, this study contributes to research on corporate political ties by highlighting the 
importance of political partners’ incentives in deriving benefits from their political ties. The 
political tie literature primarily focuses on political actors’ ability to benefit connected firms 
(e.g., Faccio et al., 2006; Fisman, 2001) and posits that powerful political partners automatically 
leverage the resources and privileges at their disposal to enhance the interests of connected firms. 
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Yet we maintain and find that political actors are not equally motivated to engage in activities 
that benefit connected firms because they identify with the firms and other relevant entities to 
various degrees. As a result, strengthening political actors’ identification with the firm and other 
complementary entities becomes critical for the firm to obtain boundary-spanning benefits from 
political institutions. Simply having powerful political partners does not necessarily lead to 
favorable firm outcomes. Thus, our results shed new light on the contingencies of the value of 
political ties (Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2008; Siegel, 2007; Zhu and Chung, 2014). 
 This study has several limitations. First, our analysis relies mainly on cross-sectional 
survey data and thus we can only identify the associations, not the causal relationships, between 
the variables. Second, our main independent and dependent variables are based on self-report 
data, so we cannot completely rule out common method bias, although our robustness checks 
show that such bias is trivial in our case. Nevertheless, future research should attempt to obtain 
longitudinal data from multiple sources to address these issues. Third, our sample was drawn 
from government directors in listed Chinese firms, so caution should be taken when generalizing 
these findings to other economies where government directors may have different incentives and 
behavior according to different institutional norms. It would be interesting to examine our 
research questions in other contexts and compare the findings. Despite the foregoing limitations, 
we consider our study as advancing our understanding of the relationship between government 
directors’ dual identifications and their governance behavior. By investigating the contingent 
governance effects of government directors’ identifications, our research integrates and 
contributes to multiple streams of literature on boards of directors, corporate governance in 
emerging economies, and political ties. It hence offers new insights into the broader question of 
when and how boards of directors engage in corporate governance. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
 
Independent variable Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Managerial monitoring 0.00 0.94 1.00              
2. Resource provision 0.00 0.97 0.28 1.00             
3. Identification with the focal firm 0.00 0.99 0.54* 0.61* 1.00            
4. Identification with the government 0.00 1.00 0.40* 0.58* 0.37* 1.00           
5. SOE dummy 0.63 0.48 -0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.07 1.00          
6. Director capital 0.15 2.35 0.10 -0.04 0.01 -0.17 -0.01 1.00         
7. Age 52.30 8.93 -0.05 0.10 0.04 0.08 -0.09 0.01 1.00        
8. Number of board seats 9.13 2.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.10 -0.15* -0.02 1.00       
9. Rewards (logged) 11.06 0.49 -0.15* -0.05 -0.13 -0.10 0.12 -0.07 0.02 0.28* 1.00      
10. Business relation 0.57 0.50 -0.05 -0.22* -0.24* -0.39* 0.12 0.21* -0.04 0.11 0.20* 1.00     
11. Independent directorship 0.36 0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.10 -0.07 0.13 -0.03 0.32* -0.16* 0.10 1.00    
12. Foreign ownership 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 1.00   
13. Government affiliation level 3.80 1.52 0.31 -0.07 -0.06 0.32* 0.19 0.33* -0.14 0.07 0.06 0.39* -0.01 -0.01 1.00  
14. Firm ROA 0.30 0.28 0.09 0.13 0.16* 0.22* 0.09 -0.05 0.11 0.02 -0.03 -0.14 0.03 0.12 -0.07 1.00 
* p<0.05 
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Table 2. Effects of government directors’ dual identifications on managerial monitoring and resource provision: OLS  
 
 Managerial monitoring Resource provision 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
(H1a) 
Model 3 
(H2a) 
Model 4 
(H2c) 
Model 5 
(H3a: 
SOE) 
Model 6 
(H3b: 
non-SOE) 
Model 7 Model 8 
(H1b) 
Model 9 
(H2b) 
Model 10 
(H2d) 
Model 11 
(H4a: 
SOE) 
Model 12 
(H4b:  
non-SOE) 
Independent variables             
Identification with the focal firm   0.562*** 
(0.027) 
0.453*** 
(0.052) 
0.445*** 
(0.049) 
0.402*** 
(0.045) 
0.393*** 
(0.127) 
 0.719*** 
(0.084) 
0.635*** 
(0.079) 
0.624*** 
(0.076) 
0.550*** 
(0.082) 
0.708*** 
(0.169) 
Identification with the government  
 
 0.168** 
(0.069) 
0.152*** 
(0.048) 
0.225*** 
(0.061) 
0.286** 
(0.143) 
  0.226*** 
(0.081) 
0.167** 
(0.084) 
0.337*** 
(0.096) 
0.162** 
(0.080) 
Identification with the government*SOE dummy     -0.086** 
(0.034) 
     0.132** 
(0.060) 
  
Identification with the focal firm*Identification 
with the government  
    -0.027** 
(0.010) 
0.098*** 
(0.033) 
    0.021** 
(0.009) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
             
Control variables             
SOE dummy -0.059 
(0.087) 
-0.085 
(0.071) 
-0.016 
(0.050) 
-0.039 
(0.055) 
  0.196** 
(0.085) 
0.208*** 
(0.078) 
0.189** 
(0.078) 
0.154* 
(0.083) 
  
 
Director capital 0.027*** 
(0.010) 
0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.020* 
(0.011) 
0.019* 
(0.011) 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.040** 
(0.019) 
0.043* 
(0.024) 
0.057* 
(0.029) 
0.062** 
(0.025) 
0.058* 
(0.029) 
0.046** 
(0.020) 
0.063* 
(0.033) 
Age -0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
Number of board seats -0.010 
(0.037) 
-0.024 
(0.025) 
-0.027 
(0.024) 
-0.024 
(0.024) 
-0.026 
(0.035) 
-0.029 
(0.026) 
-0.050 
(0.064) 
-0.059* 
(0.033) 
-0.063* 
(0.033) 
-0.056* 
(0.031) 
-0.054 
(0.043) 
-0.062 
(0.045) 
Rewards (logged) -0.281*** 
(0.093) 
-0.066 
(0.064) 
-0.075 
(0.060) 
-0.076 
(0.060) 
0.081 
(0.062) 
-0.051 
(0.093) 
0.114 
(0.118) 
0.086 
(0.092) 
0.077 
(0.086) 
0.073 
(0.096) 
0.039 
(0.101) 
0.204 
(0.158) 
Independent directorship 0.209 
(0.892) 
0.193 
(0.758) 
0.185 
(0.867) 
0.190 
(0.804) 
0.186 
(0.917) 
0.159 
(0.728) 
0.185 
(1.215) 
0.941 
(0.682) 
1.156* 
(0.646) 
1.036 
(0.671) 
1.025 
(0.682) 
1.179 
(0.735) 
Foreign ownership 0.285 
(0.533) 
0.142 
(0.174) 
0.087 
(0.181) 
0.147 
(0.177) 
-1.222 
(1.198) 
0.167 
(0.274) 
1.637*** 
(0.302) 
0.971*** 
(0.192) 
0.894*** 
(0.221) 
0.985*** 
(0.213) 
1.290** 
(0.596) 
0.840*** 
(0.318) 
Government affiliation level 0.225*** 
(0.037) 
0.245*** 
(0.024) 
0.280*** 
(0.030) 
0.288*** 
(0.028) 
0.303*** 
(0.029) 
0.338*** 
(0.083) 
0.026 
(0.035) 
0.006 
(0.034) 
0.042 
(0.035) 
0.052 
(0.036) 
0.050 
(0.042) 
0.076 
(0.105) 
Business relation  -0.233*** 
(0.088) 
-0.073 
(0.055) 
-0.042 
(0.055) 
-0.041 
(0.055) 
-0.091 
(0.071) 
-0.081 
(0.097) 
-0.233* 
(0.128) 
-0.074 
(0.086) 
-0.036 
(0.078) 
-0.038 
(0.080) 
-0.078 
(0.101) 
0.060 
(0.115) 
Firm ROA  0.239 
(0.153) 
0.150 
(0.092) 
0.055 
(0.086) 
0.042 
(0.086) 
0.027 
(0.109) 
-0.224 
(0.146) 
0.288 
(0.236) 
-0.085 
(0.124) 
-0.140 
(0.122) 
-0.124 
(0.139) 
-0.118 
(0.146) 
-0.252 
(0.194) 
Constant 0.239 
(1.153) 
-0.198 
(0.639) 
-0.170 
(0.688) 
-0.140 
(0.694) 
-0.233 
(0.678) 
-1.291 
(1.668) 
0.669 
(1.367) 
-1.118 
(1.035) 
-1.427 
(1.023) 
-1.369 
(1.021) 
-2.104 
(1.879) 
-2.974 
(2.083) 
R-square 36.53% 50.64% 57.78% 64.52% 61.86% 60.15% 55.98% 64.49% 68.87% 71.46% 68.27% 71.05% 
Number of observations 214 214 214 214 135 79 214 214 214 214 135 79 
Note: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Effects identification with the government on managerial monitoring and 
resource provision in SOEs versus non-SOEs  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction effect of dual identifications on managerial monitoring in 
SOEs and non-SOEs 
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Figure 3. Interaction effect of dual identifications on resource provision in SOEs 
and non-SOEs 
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APPENDIX 
Part 1. Behavior of directors 
1. How often do you attend board meetings?  
A. Never attend   B. Rarely   C. Often   D. Always attend  
To what extent do you agree with the following? (7=strongly agree, 1=do not agree at all) 
2. I monitor the strategic decision making by the CEO of the focal firm. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 
1)  
3. I criticize and seek to influence the content of the strategic initiatives proposed by the 
CEO of the focal firm if the initiatives would be harmful to the firm. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1)  
4. I provide comments on the design of incentive schemes for the CEO of the focal firm 
according to his/her performance. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1)  
5. I provide advice and counsel on strategic issues, problems, and challenges faced by the 
focal firm.  (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1)  
6. I provide personal referrals to third-party sources of strategic advice to the CEO of the 
focal firm whenever necessary. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1)  
Part 2. Items measuring identification with the focal firm 
To what extent do you agree with the following? (7=strongly agree, 1=do not agree at all) 
1. When someone criticizes the firm, it feels like a personal insult. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) 
2. I am very interested in what people think about the firm. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1)  
3. When I talk about the firm, I often say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) 
4. When someone makes positive remarks about the firm, it feels like a personal 
compliment. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) 
5. This firm’s successes are my successes. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) 
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6. Being a board member of the firm is a major part of who I am. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) 
7. Imagine that one of the circles on the left represents your self-definition or identity 
and the other circle on the right represents the firm. Please indicate which case (A, B, 
C, D, E, F, G, or H) best describes the level of overlap between your self-definition 
and the firm. 
   
A                                                                                         Far apart 
B                                                                                         Close together but separate 
C                                                                                         Very small overlap 
D                                                                                         Small overlap 
E                                                                                          Moderate overlap 
F                                                                                          Large overlap 
G                                                                                         Very large overlap 
H                                                                                         Complete overlap 
8. Please indicate to what degree your self-image overlaps with the firm’s.  
(7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) 
Part 3. Items measuring identification with the government 
To what extent do you agree with the following? (7=strongly agree, 1=do not agree at all) 
1. When someone criticizes the government or its agencies with which I am affiliated, it 
feels like a personal insult. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) 
2. I am very interested in what people think about the government. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1)  
3. When I talk about the government, I often say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 
1) 
4. When someone makes positive remarks about the government, it feels like a personal 
compliment. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) 
Me Focal Firm 
Firm 
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5. The government’s successes are my successes. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) 
6. Being a member of the government is a major part of who I am. (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) 
7. Imagine that one of the circles on the left represents your self-definition or identity 
and the other circle on the right represents the government. Please indicate which case 
(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, or H) best describes the level of overlap between your self-
definition and the government. 
   
A                                                                                        Far apart 
B                                                                                        Close together but separate 
C                                                                                        Very small overlap 
D                                                                                        Small overlap 
E                                                                                         Moderate overlap 
F                                                                                         Large overlap 
G                                                                                        Very large overlap 
H                                                                                        Complete overlap 
8. Please indicate to what degree your self-image overlaps with the government’s.  
(7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Me Government 
